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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
S'l'ATE OF UTAH, by and through
its DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAl\lE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No.
11362

UNITED GEOPHYSICAL COMPANY, a foreign corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENTS
EXPLANATION
For reference purposes, respondent has marked the
<le]Jositions Exhibits A, B, C and D and will cite the page
in the exhibit where the fact is set forth.
The copy of letter dated .May 9, 1963 attached to
}llaintiff's request for admissions is not a part of the record certified to this Court, but the parties have stipulated
that it be filed and marked Exhibit 1.
Defendant and Unite<l Electro Dynamics, Inc. are the
sa111e corporation.
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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
1

jvl. a"

1~,

t

Exc~pt for the erroneous contention that the action

_'

is based m part upon detrimental reliance on representa·~, : L .1 tions, appellant's statement of case is acceptable. Neither
t;_,, .· 1
· detriment nor reliance nor misrepresentation is alleged
,

1

•• ,

.....

..•'Jr-,,., i~ h~_cori1p~a.~Ft,~r/~~i~ft:3"e
l~ewcere
1
f ' .\ . . \. : . r '
•' \

~( C '

.

J l\
' ", ,1 •

:.

~he rec~rd.

..
in,
. ; • ;' ' ' '· . -~. ""t-/r .. c..
d .J.t ' ,.. ' .
,: )
~;'"·: 1DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .

Ji.:: ·,', '~ ·.

!
!

.t.

'I''

;:.."'• •"" \ \; ~
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
• ,.../:..' .. ·'. ( \ a summary judgment and dismissed the action.
~,·-

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent is satisfied with the judgment of the
lower court and seeks to have it affirmed.
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement is not supported by any reference to the record and to the extent that it does not coincide with the following facts, is not agreed to by respondent.
The action is based on an alleged breach of defendant's "assurance and guarantee to compensate the Fish
and Game Department for the reasonable value of any
loss sustained by the fisheries resource as the result of
detonations of explosives in Bear Lake." (R-1). The
damage claimed was a substantial kill of cisco, white fish
and lake trout having an asserted value of $150,000 and a
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$50,000 damage to the spawning area of the cisco fish.
(R 1).
':Che explosives were detonated by defendant for the
pmpose of studying seismic propagation paths and regional travel times in the Western United States as part
of the VELA Uniform Program of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense. (Ex. 1).
Defendant was engaged by the United States Geological
8 nrvey to make the study. (Ex. 1).
Defendant requested permission of the Fish and
Game Department to use Flaming Gorge Reservoir as one
of the shot locations. It also wished to use Bear Lake.
The request was contained in the letter dated May 9, 1963.
(Ex. 1). Permission to make the tests was granted by a
formal resolution of the Fish and Game Department
adopted on May 15, 1963. (Ex. A, p. 4-5).
rrhe explosions in Bear Lake were conducted on May
23, and again on May 24. A representative of the Fish
and Game Department accompanied the defendant's ProjPct Manager and pointed ont the deepest water in the
Lake. (Ex. B, p. 7.) About the same time defendant also
detonated explosives in Flaming Gorge Reservoir, as a
rPsult of which a number of rainbow trout were killed.
(Ex. A, p. 10). The plaintiff makes no complaint of fish
killed in Flaming Gorge. (R. 1).
Admittedly a substantial number of cisco fish were
killed by the explosions in Bear Lake. A few white fish
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and an insignificant number of lake trout were also killed.
(Ex. B, p. 10-13).
Cisco fish are found only in Bear Lake and cannot be
restocked. (Ex. A, p. 44). They are small and cannot
be taken from the water by angling or by any kind of
lure. (Ex. D, p. 21). They are captured by the use of
nets and only during the spawning season when they come
to shore. (Ex. D, p. 19). This method of taking cisco
from the Lake is aptly designated by the Department as
"harvesting." (Ex. D, p. 21).
Prior to 1958 the Fish and Game Department imposed no restrictions upon the harvesting of cisco. Since
then, the regulations limit the number that can be taken
and also the size of the nets to be used. (Ex. D, p. 20).
The open season corresponds to the spawning season.
The latter varies somewhat with weather conditions. (Ex.
X).

POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
DEFENDANT DID NOT AGREE TO PAY THE PLAIN·
TIFF FOR FISH KILLED IN BEAR LAKE.
POINT II.
FISH IN BEAR LAKE ARE FERAE NATURA AND
PLAINTIFF HAS NO PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THEM.
POINT III.
THE FISHING RESOURCES OF THE STATE WERE
NOT DAMAGED OR INJURED BY THE EXPLOSIONS IN
BEAR LAKE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT DID NOT AGREE TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF FOR FISH KILLED IN BEAR LAKE.

The agreement which plaintiff asserts was breached
hy the defendant is contained in the letter dated May 9,
J %3, addressed to the Director of the Fish and Game Department and signed by the defendant's Project Manager
and the resolution of the Department dated May 15th,
granting permission to detonate explosives in Flaming
Gorge and Bear Lake. There is nothing to indicate that
this agreement was varied or added to in any particular.
Mr. Harold Crane, the Director of the Department, con<lucted the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the
resolution and his deposition will not support any claim
that the defendant made any commitment, promise or
representation other than set forth in the letter of May
9. His deposition affirmatively discloses that in granting
the permission to make the tests, the Department relied
entirely upon the letter of May 9. It likewise discloses
that the tests were made exactly as defendant proposed
in the letter. Representatives of the Department were
pn~sent when the explosives were detonated and assisted
ddendant in locating the deepest water in the Lake. The
t>xplosions were made on two or three different days, and
no one made any protest before or after either explosion.
l\fr. Crane died before the pre-trial hearing and no

further evidence concerning extraneous promises :i\rep-
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resentations can be produced. Under familiar principlrs
of law, all prior, oral negotiations, represc~ntations and
promises are merged in the written agreement and evidence of such extraneous matters is inadmi:::;sible, even
if available, which it is not. See Last Chance, etc. v.
Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P.2d 952.
Apparently there were conversations between Mr.
Crane and representatives of defendant subsequent to foe
resolution of the Department. However, any assurance
made in these conversations did not go beyond those contained in the letter of May 9. See Exhibit A, p. 9-10.
Furthermore, a written obligation cannot, in the absence-,
of fraud or mutual mistake, be enlarged by a subsequent \
oral promise. See Ephraim Theater vs. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d
163, 321 P.2d 221.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, neither the
letter agreement of May 9 nor the resolution of the Department adopted on May 15 is ambiguous, uncertain or
unintelligible. The letter recites that it is a request for
permission to use Flaming Gorge Reservoir as one of the
shot locations. "We also wish to use Bear Lake." The
site selected is at Jarvis Canyon, approximately seven
miles upstream from the dam. This site is located in the
Flaming Gorge Reservoir. Nothing is said about a site
for the shot locations in Bear Lake. The testimony indicates that at the time the letter of May 9 was written, defendant did not know whether the shot locations in Bear
Lake would be in Utah or in Idaho. All that was known
then was that the shots were to be made in the deepest
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water of the Lake. The point of deepest water was not
known until the plaintiff's representative pointed it out
to the defendant.
The letter says that four or five shots would be fired
on consecutive days. After specifying the maximum
charge for any one shot and fixing the dates when the
same are to be fired, the defendant "assumes responsibility and any resulting liabilities entailed in the use of
this reservoir as a shot location."
The concluding paragraph of the letter represents
that defendant had obtained permission from the Department of the Interior "to use Flaming Gorge Reservoir as
a shot location" and that any game fish killed as a result
of these explosions would be restocked by defendant in a
manner that is agreeable to the Utah Fish and Game De.partment.
The resolution of the Department granting the requested permission is likewise clear and unambiguous. It
recites almost the exact language of the defendant's letter.
Commissioner Nelson moved that "the Department grant
defendant permission to use Flaming Gorge and Bear
Lake as shot locations with the approval of the Commission." The motion "\Vas passed unanimously.
The language of a contract is to be given its plain,
ordinary meaning unless technical terms are used (Plain
City, etc. v. Hooper, etc., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P.2d 625)
and it is to be construed in the light of the circumstances

8
surrounding its execution. Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah
354 P.2d 121.

~d

440,

In this connection, it should be kept in mind that cisco
fish are indigenous to Bear Lake and cannot be restocked.
Neither can they be taken from the Lake by angling or by
any form of lure. "\Vhite fish and lake trout likewise cannot be restocked. The only method of maintaining the
cisco, ·white fish and lake trout population of Bear LakP
is by natural propagation.
The only species of fish that have been domesticated
and which can be successfully restocked is the rainbow
trout. At the time of the explosions, Utah, Wyoming and
the United States were in the process of stocking Flaming Gorge Reservoir with several million rainbow trout.
(Ex. A, p. 11).
Respondent contends that the letter agreement of
May 9, upon which the plaintiff must and does rely, does
not bind the respondent to pay any damage or the reasonable value of any fish killed as a result of the explosions.
Its commitment was "the assumption of responsibility
and resulting liabilities entailed in the use of this reservoir as a shot location,'' and to ''restock game fish''
killed by these explosions.
The responsibilities and resulting liabilities so assumed by the defendant were the responsibilities and liabilities of the plaintiff which it might incur by consenting
to the explosions. It would he meaningless for defendant
to assume its own responsibilities and liabilities. rrlwy

!I

\\ 011ld n•mam with the defendant whether it expressly
asstmu·d thc>m or not. 'fhe plain import of this provision is
to indemnify the plaintiff against claims for personal in.i 11r.v and property damage. No such responsibilities or
liabilities arose. Furthermore, the indemnification is for
liability ''entailed by the use of this resc>rvoir" as a shot
location. "'l1his reservoir" means Flaming Gorge because
that is the only reservoir involved in the project or mentioned in the letter.
The second aspect of defendant's obligation is as
eh~ar as the first. After reciting that permission had been
obtained from the federal government to use Flaming
Oorge Reservoir as a shot location, the letter proceeds:
"Any game fish killed as a rPsult of these explosions
\rnuld be restocked" by defendant in a manner agreeable
to the Department. The gist of this undertaking is restocking, and the only inquiry is: ·what fish are to be
restocked~ The arn-5wer is that it is the fish killed in Flaming Gorge Resenoir because "these explosions" clearly
mid directly refer to the explosions in Flaming Gorge.
Those are the only fish that can be restocked and to construe defendant's undertaking as a promise to restock
fish killed in Bear Lake wonld be tantamount to construing it as a promise to do the impossible.
A promise to do that which is impossible to do is a
uwrP idle ceremony. If the parties were aware of the
impossibility, the promise is not real or genuine and
ll\'ither is the acceptance of it. They are not actually
l1arµ;aining.
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" ( 1) Where the existence of a specific thing or
person is, either by the terms of a bargain or in
the contemplation of both parties, necessary for
the performance of a promise in the bargain, a
duty to perform the promise
(a) never arises if at the time the bargain
is made the existence of the thing or
person within the time for seasonable
performance is impossible, and
(b) is discharged if the thing or person subsequently is not in existence in time for
seasonable performance,
unless a contrary intention is manifested, or the
contributing fault of the promisor causes the
nonexistence." Restatement, Contracts,§ 460.
"Where the impossibility is known to both of the
parties at the time of making the agreement, there
can be no intention of performing it on the one
side, and no expectation of its being performed on
the other, and therefore one of the essentials of a
valid promise, viz., a legal consideration, is wanting." 9 Cyc. 627.
See also 17 Am. J ur. 2d, § 10, p. 345-G.
Another surrounding circumstance which indicates
that it was the intention of the parties to confine the defendant's restocking obligation to fish killed in Flaming
Gorge Reservoir is that an elaborate system of cages was
installed in the reservoir to form a basis for determining
the number of rainbow trout which might be killed. No
such precautions were taken with respect to the explosions in Bear Lake. All of these considerations point un-
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erringly to an intention to limit defendant's restocking
obligation to a location where it could be performed.
Plaintiff's rather devious contention that defendant's
obligation under the letter agreement was enlarged by a
subsequent, oral assurance made to the Department is refuted by Mr. Crane. After stating that "defendant's
representative assured me that we had nothing to worry
about in Bear Lake and if we did that they would assume
fnll responsibility for any losses," he continued, "and, of
course, he reiterated that they had previously stated that
in the letter so we didn't need to be concerned."

"Q.

So that in the conversation, he reaffirmed
what had been said in the letter of May 9,
1963~

A.

Yes."

Mr. Crane further stated that there was no correspondence from the defendant other than the letter of May
9, which related to explosions in Bear Lake. (Ex. A, p. 6).
In this state of the record, there is no basis for any claim
that defendant's obligation set forth in the letter of May
9 was modified, supplemented or added to by any additional correspondence or by any oral representation or
assurance.
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POINT II.
FISH IN BEAR LAKE ARE FERAE NATURA AND
PLAINTIFF HAS NO PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THEl\I.

Fish in interstate bodies of water are ferae natitra.
No one has poss<>ssion of them and po::;session is the finst
step toward ownership or property rights. rn1ey arP
migratory and are actnally in the state only at intervals.
Until they are captured they are res nullis and not a subject of ownership or property rights. It is a fiction to say
that tlH'Y are the property of the state or of tl11:,~ people
of the state.
"Until actual capture has been effected no property is acquired in the denizens of the wild. Except by legal fiction, Oregon has not, strictly
speaking, a proprietary right in the fish in its
streams. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 41G,
43-1:, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641, 11 A.L.R. 984.
Supervision of wild life is exercised, moreover, as
a trust for the people of the particular state, not
as a 'prerogative for the advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the
public good.' Geer v. Connecticut, l 61 U.S. 519,
529, 16 S. Ct. 600, 604, 40 L. Ed. 793." Th01nso11 i·.
Dana 52 F.2d 759.
"The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction PxprPssive in legal
shorthand of the importance to its people that a
State have power to preserve and regulate thP
exploitation of an important resource.'' Toomer 1.:.
lVitsell, :33-1: U.8. 385, (m 8.C't. 115G.
''There is a real distinction and difference between
the right of the State in its lands and personal
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property and its rights in fish in the public waters
of the State. In its proprietary property it has
absolute rights. In fish in tlw pnblic waters the
State has a sovereign right primarily and essentially of preservation, conservation, and regulation for the people of tlw State, whose right is to
take fish from the public waters subject to the regulations imposed by the State for the benefit of
the people of the State. People of the State may
take fish from the public waters unless forbidden
by law. They may not legally take proprietary
property of the State unless authorized to do so
by due course of law." State v. Stotuaniire, 179
So. 730.
Plaintiff bases its claim of ownership upon Section
23-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, \vhich states that all game and fish
now or hereafter within this state are declared to be the
property of the state. The legislatures of most states
have made a similar declaration. These statutes are mere
assertions of the sovereign power of the state to control,
proic>ct and propagate fish and game. No further force or
dfect can be given to thc>m. Neither the state nor the
legislature has or can create any property interest in
migrator)' or wild animals which are here today and gone
tomorrow. Any concept of property rights in such animals is totally unrealistic. Complete force and effect
ean be given to these declarations by interpreting them
as assertions of powPr to control and protect wildlife
whenever it is within the boundaries of the state. See
Jfis:-;ouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 41G, 64 L.E<l. 641, 40 S. c;~~~
382, 11 A.L.R. 984.
:>
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Since plaintiff has no proprietary interest or pro1>erty right in fosh in BPar Lake, tlwre is no foundation
for any recovery of the reasonablP value of those that
were killed and no occasion to inquire into the soundness
of the very unique theory of damages ad\-ocated in appellant's brief.
POINT III.
THE FISHING RESOURCES OF THE STATE WERE
NOT DAMAGED OR INJURED BY THE EXPLOSIONS IN
BEAR LAKE.

The letter of May 9 discloses that defendant informed the Director of the Fish and Game Department
of the exact nature of the tests to be conducted and the
locations where the chemicals would be detonated, also the
maximum charge size of the shots. The Department
made a careful investigation of the fish loss that could
be expected to result from the explosions. The application was considered by the Commission at a regular
meeting called for that purpose and permission was
granted by a formal n•solnhon adopted b:v the unanimous
vote of the Commission. It is obvious that the Commission concluded that the tests could be conducted without
injury to the fishing resources of the state. Subsequent
events have clearly demonstrated that the judgment of
the Commission in this respect has been vindicated. Fish
were killed in both Bear Lake and Flaming Gorge Reservoir. The state concedPs that the fish loss in Flaming
Gorge did not injure or damage the fishing resources of
the reservoir. The number kill<>d were easily and readily
restocked.
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As to the cisco fish killed in Bear Lake, the evidence
dis<·los<>s that the fishing resource of this Lake has actually increased and expanded since the defendant conduct<'U its tests. (Ex. X). Both the number of harvesters of
cisco and the size of the harvest have actually increased
to a very substantial degree since 1963. There is not a
suggestion in the record that any harvester has failed to
net his limit because of any diminution in the supply. The
number of harvesters and the number of cisco harvested
depends upon the length of the spawning season and
weather conditions. Cisco population is not a factor in
valuating the fishing resource of Bear Lake.
More conclusive evidence that the fishing resource of
Bear Lake has not been damaged so far as cisco are conc<:>rned is the fact that the Fish and Game Department
has shipped large numbers of these fish to both California
and Idaho since the explosions occurred. The shipments
to California went to Lake Tahoe for the purpose of establishing a supply of forage fish for the lake trout. The
shipments to Idaho were for experimental purposes.
That large numbers of cisco fish in Bear Lake are
expendable is indicated by the fact that the Department
permits them to be harvested during their spawning
season when, for every female cisco netted, hundreds of
eggs are destroyed.
There is no evidence that the loss of the few mackinaw impaired that particular fishing resource in the lake.

The number killed was insignificant and any los:s would
be theoretical only and temporary.
The white fish population of Bear Lake appears to
be as abundant as the cisco and there is no evidence that
any fisherman's rights have been impaired by the small
number killed by the explosions.
There is also a total absence of any damage or injmy
to the spawning grounds of the cisco fish in Bear Lake.
Plaintiff does not allege any damage to the spawning
ground of any other fish. The chemicals were exploded
at a depth of 160 feet and at a point almost a half mile
from the spawning area of the cisco fish. There is no
probability whatever that any damage to this spawning
area could have resulted from the explosions. The spawning season had closed five months before the explosions
occurred and an investigation of the spawning area made
by a representative of the Department disclosed that the
spawning area had greatly expanded after the tests "\vere
made. (Ex. X).
We are not suggesting that the Fish and Game Department can indiscriminately authorize the use of explosives in Bear Lake. The defendant conducted these
explosions to obtain classified information for the protection of the country in the eyent of "\Var. It was not
taking fish and it did not request any license or privilege
to take fish. The State of Utah, through its Fish and
Game Department, after due deliberation, concluded that
the tests could be made ·without impairment of the fish-
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ing resources or the rights of the public to take fish from
t lw public water. Its judgment in that matter was correct
and it i:-; to be commended for participating in a project
de.signed to obtain scientific information to be used in
defense of the country.
SUMMARY
Defendant's letter of May 9, 1963 and the resolution
of the Fish and Game Commission embodies the entire
agreement of the parties and it is not modified by any
oral representations or assurances or by written documents. It is clear and unambiguous and obligates the
defendant to indemnify the State against claims of liahili ty for personal injuries and damage to property, and
to restock game fish killed in Flaming Gorge Reservoir.
There has been no breach of either of these obligations.
The plaintiff has no proprietary interest or property
right in the fish in Bear Lake and cannot recover any
damage on account of fish killed as a result of the explos10ns.
Neither the fishery nor the fishing resources have
been damaged or injured by the explosions, and the right
of the public to take fish from Bear Lake has not been
adversely affected or impaired.
Fish in Bear Lake are not the subject of ownership
or property rights and the only remedy for killing such
fil'h is fine and/or imprisonment.
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We respectfully submit that the judgment of the
trial court is correct and should be affirmed.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORN\VALL & McCARTHY
By:

Grant H. Bagley
Clifford L. Ash ton
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent

